



























































This article reviews the Report of the Tax Working Group of the Victoria 
University of Wellington, which included individuals from the Treasury and the 
Inland Revenue Department, as well as from the business community. The Report 
makes an important contribution to the tax policy debate in New Zealand by setting 
out the reasons for reform, the basic principles used to consider alternative policies, 
and the advantages and disadvantages of a range of reform proposals. The purpose of 
this review of the Report is not to discuss the proposals and recommendations in 
detail, but to consider a number of aspects concerning the evaluation of tax structures 
and to try to clarify some arguments which are not stated explicitly in the Report. An 
indication of useful next steps is also given.  
                                                 
1 Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, Australia. In preparing this paper, I have 
benefited from discussions with Bob Buckle, Norman Gemmell, Denis O’Brien and David White. This 
paper is based on two presentations in New Zealand in February 2010. First, a Treasury Guest Lecture, 
jointly sponsored by the New Zealand Treasury, the Centre for Accounting, Governmance and 
Taxation Research (CAGTR) and the Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation (ISCR) at 
Victoria University of Wellington, was delivered on 23 February 2010. Second, a presentation was 
made at the Auckland Business School on 25 February 2010.  
1  Introduction 
The Report of the Victoria University of Wellington Tax Working Group 
(TWG), A Tax System for New Zealand’s Future (2010) is remarkable for several 
reasons.
2 It represents a unique collaboration among individuals from the Treasury, 
the Inland Revenue Department and the Centre for Accounting, Governance and 
Taxation Research (CAGTR), along with a range of other acknowledged tax experts. 
Taxation is an area where strong disagreement and argument at cross purposes is 
notoriously present, and yet the TWG has, under the leadership of Professor Bob 
Buckle, produced a valuable report that is clearly written, generally non-dogmatic and 
non-didactic, with balanced arguments and a judicious use of supporting data and 
charts. Despite the technical nature of the subject, the Report also communicates with 
a wide audience. 
The Report has also been produced with remarkable speed and relatively 
cheaply. Favourable comparisons may, for example, be made with the reviews being 
carried out by the Australian Treasury (Australia’s Future Tax System) and the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (Reforming the Tax System for the 21
st Century) in the UK. 
These achievements should not be underestimated: indeed, they are worth celebrating. 
What kind of Report has the TWG produced? It is probably best described as 
an exercise in ‘Rational Policy Analysis’. By this is meant that its aim is mainly to 
examine the implications, using a variety of measures, of a range of alternative 
                                                 
2 This can be downloaded from: http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/twg/Report.aspx  policies. This involves a clear statement of the criteria against which a tax structure 
may be compared. It encourages an understanding of why different people may not 
agree about the best way to proceed, and therefore allows for rational discussion 
rather than heated argument. The Report is refreshingly free of the kind of rhetoric 
which is so often a part of taxation debates. 
It is true (and unfortunate in the present writer’s view) that at times (towards 
the end of the report) the TWG has been unable to resist the pressure to make specific 
proposals for reform of the NZ tax structure though in doing so it is careful to point 
out that its members are not always unanimous. However, I understand that the 
pressure to produce recommendations came from outside the TWG. But rational 
policy analysis at its best provides the information which enables others, using their 
own value judgements and views about likely orders of magnitude, to make up their 
own minds.
3  
The structure of the Report is clear. It begins – after a brief discussion of the 
role of taxes – by outlining the reasons why reforms are needed to the tax structure, 
arising from both domestic and international changes since the previous major 
reforms of the 1980s, and why adjustments to existing rates and thresholds are 
                                                 
3 An early statement of aims was made in Buckle, R.A. (2009) Towards a world class tax system. 
Presentation to IRD’s Technical Leaders Conference, 25 August. He stated (p. 2) ‘The purposes of the 
Tax Working Group are to provide a forum for informed discussion of the priorities for medium-term 
tax policy that can feed into advice to Government Ministers and to promote and inform a wider public 
debate on tax policy. … It was not designed primarily to lead to specific policy recommendations but 
rather to allow full identification of the issues that will need to be considered in reviewing medium-
term tax policy’. unlikely to be sufficient. Motivated by the extent to which the tax rate applied to 
corporations, trusts and the top personal tax rate have become ‘misaligned’, it then 
considers a range of alternative methods of taxing corporations, keeping in mind the 
increasing extent of international capital mobility. Corporation and personal income 
taxation are judged to give rise to harmful disincentive and welfare effects. Reforms 
such as reductions in personal income tax rates, combined with an increase in the 
GST rate, are discussed. A range of methods designed to broaden the tax base, are 
also considered. These involve the introduction of a Land Tax and extensions to the 
Capital Gains Tax, along with a range of smaller reforms concerning, for example, 
depreciation allowances for property investment. In each case the advantages and 
disadvantages are carefully discussed.  
In considering changes, an important feature is that the TWG restricted its 
attention to reforms which are revenue neutral. That is, the total tax revenue is 
estimated to remain unchanged. Revenue neutral changes examined by the TWG 
assume an absence of behavioural responses to tax changes, such as profit shifting by 
corporations and labour supply responses by individuals. Such behavioural responses 
may be substantial.
 4 To the extent that a policy change improves incentives and 
increases taxable incomes (including profits), post-reform tax revenue is likely to be 
understated.  
The restriction to revenue neutral changes is necessary because any change in 
revenue involves another unspecified policy, so that alternatives cannot properly be 
                                                 
444 For examples using a behavioural microsimulation model for Australia, see Buddelmeyer, H., 
Creedy, J. and Kalb, G. (2008) Tax Policy Design and Behavioural Microsimulation Modelling 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). compared. Thus, for example, the argument that concerns about the future adequacy 
of tax revenue would disappear if only government expenditure were cut would be 
irresponsible, unless at the same time a detailed set of proposals for cutting 
expenditure were produced and their implications examined. Expenditure 
considerations were outside the scope of the review.  
Any revenue neutral change in the tax structure must of course involve some 
winners and some losers. Hence unanimity cannot be expected and distributional 
value judgements cannot be avoided. It is therefore important to attempt to make such 
value judgements explicit, since they are the source of many disputes about tax 
policy. Given the inevitability of there being some losers from a tax policy change, a 
strong desire on the part of policy makers to avoid losers clearly creates a bias 
towards the status quo.  
The main points of the TWG are well made. These include: the case for 
significant reforms in view of the domestic changes in New Zealand since the 
previous major reforms of the 1980s and which involve expenditure and revenue-
raising concerns; the need for changes which place less reliance on taxes (such as 
personal income taxes and corporation taxes) where there are efficiency problems and 
where labour and capital are mobile; the need for some base-broadening in a number 
of areas; the need to bring corporation, trust and personal tax rates into closer 
alignment; and the need to review the interaction between personal income taxes and 
the structure of benefits, giving rise to very high effective marginal tax rates.  
There is little point here in simply going over the detail of the various 
proposals. The aim of this review of the TWG Report is to consider a number of 
aspects concerning the Report’s evaluation of tax structures and to try to clarify some 
points which are not stated explicitly in the Report. The evaluation of tax structures is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 examines some concepts which, it is suggested, 
could perhaps have been discussed more clearly in the Review. Some indication of the 
required next steps is then given in Section 4, and brief conclusions are in Section 5.  
2  Evaluating Tax Structures 
This section discusses the TWG Report’s approach to the evaluation of tax 
structures. The basic principles adopted by the TWG are examined in subsection 2.1, 
and this is followed by discussion of some features which, it is suggested, need some 
further elaboration and more clarity. The choice of tax base is considered in 
subsection 2.2. The distinction between ‘rules of thumb’ and tax principles is 
explained in subsection 2.3. It is suggested that an appreciation of these points should 
help readers to obtain a clearer understanding of the main arguments of the Report. 
2.1  Basic Tax Principles 
The TWG Report sets out six ‘principles of a good tax system’. These are: 
efficiency and growth; equity and fairness; revenue integrity; fiscal cost; compliance 
and administration cost; and coherence (as part of a multi-tax and benefit structure). 
Any statement of tax principles inevitably brings to mind Adam Smith’s famous ‘four 
maxims’, which are frequently discussed and extended.
5 A fundamental problem is 
                                                 
5 Smith’s maxims, stated in The Wealth of Nations (1776), were: payment according to benefit received 
(though there was some ambiguity as to whether this coincides with ability to pay); certainty; 
convenience; and economy (in collection). A longer list was produced by G.W. Norman, whose list 
included: frugal; computable; simple; constant; divisible; popular; non-interferent; equal; uncorruptive; that, even if these principles were substantially elaborated, it would not be possible to 
treat them as axioms and from them derive an implied ‘ideal’ tax structure. The TWG 
appeared to recognise that even the production of a table, listing tax policies in the 
rows and the principles in columns, with ticks and crosses in appropriate boxes, 
would not in the present context provide sufficient information (given the nature of 
the principles). The Report thus more usefully produced tables listing various 
advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. These features in fact include 
further criteria such as ‘certainty regarding future taxes’ (see pp. 28, 64). 
However, it is suggested that there are some important principles which are 
implicit in the Report, but which really need to be made explicit. Thus, only on p. 56 
is mention made of the fact that ‘value judgements are necessary to determine the 
priorities and respective weighting of these objectives’. The fact that value 
judgements play such an important role in tax policy decisions explains also why 
there is usually so much disagreement in tax policy debates.
6 It is seldom clear if 
opponents disagree because they hold different value judgements, or because they 
form different views about the way people respond to tax changes (given that 
complete information is never available). This is precisely how rational policy 
analysis can help – by indicating the implications of adopting different values, so that 
readers can make up their own minds.  
                                                                                                                                            
unvexatious; and unevasible. See O’Brien, D.P. with Creedy, J. (2009) Taxation and the Promotion of 
Human Happiness: An Essay by George Warde Norman. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
6 This point is discussed in detail in Creedy, J. (2010) Tax and transfer tensions: designing direct tax 
structures. Australian Economic Review (forthcoming). 2.2  The Tax Base 
A fundamental judgement taken by the TWG – and not fully articulated in the 
Report - is that taxes should reflect ‘ability to pay’, rather than the ‘benefits received’ 
as a result of the subsequent public expenditure. Thus, it is stated that, ‘a good tax 
system should [ensure that] taxes paid reflect ability to pay’ (p. 59). In considering 
ability to pay, a further important step is taken in suggesting that it ‘should’ be 
measured by ‘comprehensive income’. Unfortunately the Report never states this 
explicitly, suggesting for example only that, ‘taxing capital gain “on accrual” would 
bring the tax system closer to taxing comprehensive income’ (p. 48) and referring to a 
capital gains tax as ‘a more comprehensive option for base broadening’ (p. 11). 
The term ‘comprehensive income’ means simply that income is defined as the 
amount that can be consumed in a given period without reducing wealth. This term is 
familiar in the public finance literature, but of course it is precisely the same as the 
Hicksian income concept and Friedman’s ‘permanent income’ concept which is 
widely used in economics. The important point here – perhaps not brought out 
sufficiently clearly in the Report – is that the adoption of this concept as the 
appropriate tax base is the fundamental reason for attempting to tax capital gains. 
Such taxes obviously face problems in dealing with those gains which accrue but are 
not realised, and the Report recognises that a ‘comprehensive capital gains tax’ is an 
impossibility. Nevertheless, there may be scope for extending CGT along the lines 
used in other countries.
7  
                                                 
7 The Report discusses the use of a risk-free rate of return method (RFRM) on property, but is generally 
not supportive. In popular debates regarding the introduction of, or extension to, a tax there is 
perhaps a tendency to judge a proposal against a ‘perfect’ tax, when of course no 
existing tax is perfect. And, there is always some resistance to a new tax. As the 
writer of the first English language full length treatise on public finance, John Ramsay 
McCulloch, declared: ‘it is sometimes better “to bear those ills we have, than to fly to 
others that we know not of”’.
8 It is therefore likely that the TWG’s discussion of 
extending CGT in New Zealand will meet with some resistance, even among those 
who may not expect to lose by such a change, but it provides a useful starting point 
for debate. 
2.3  Rules of Thumb 
An important position taken by the Report is that, ‘the TWG considers that the 
broad-base low-rate [BB-LR] option is generally a sound principle to adopt’ (pp. 16, 
64). However, the adoption of BB-LR is not in fact a ‘principle’, but a rule of thumb.
9 
It is nevertheless a useful rule. It arises from recognition that the efficiency cost (in 
terms of the excess burden) of a tax is approximately proportional to the square of the 
tax rate.
10 Hence it is useful, other things being equal, to keep the rate low, and this is 
                                                 
8 See McCulloch, J. R. (1863) A Treatise on the Principles and Practical Influence of Taxation and the 
Funding System (Edited with introduction by D.P. O’Brien, 1970. London: Allen and Unwin). Here 
McCulloch is quoting from probably the most famous speech in Shakespeare (Hamlet, ‘To be or not to 
be …’), and so does not bother to give his readers the source.  
9 For further discussion of this rule of thumb, see Creedy, J. (2009) Personal income taxation: from 
theory to policy. Australian Economic Review, 42, pp. 495-506. 
10 For an introduction to the excess burden concept and explanation of the approximation, see Creedy, 
J. (2004) The excess burden of taxation. Australian Economic Review, 37, pp. 454-464. achieved by keeping the tax base as broad as possible. But of course in evaluating a 
tax structure there are other considerations (as indeed are indicated in the TWG’s own 
list of criteria), involving distributional value judgements, along with ‘merit good’ 
and externality arguments.  
The BB-LR rule of thumb leads, in the Report, directly to the suggestion that 
the top marginal income tax rate should be reduced. But it is important to recognise 
that such a judgement requires more detailed information. For example, using the 
Australian tax microsimulation model, The Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer 
Simulator (MITTS),
11 it has been found that there is considerable heterogeneity in 
excess burdens and marginal welfare costs of tax changes. Many individuals below 
the top marginal rate face high burdens, depending on demographic and other 
characteristics. Using a utilitarian type of social welfare function which allows for a 
degree of aversion to inequality, the analysis of ‘optimal’ marginal tax reforms does 
not always suggest cutting the top rate. When inequality aversion is very high, 
optimal reforms may involve cutting other rates first.
12 This is a further example of 
the point that economic ‘efficiency’ criteria alone are not sufficient to determine 
policy – value judgements play an important role. 
Some ambivalence is also present in the TWG’s discussion of the ‘alignment’ 
of the corporation tax rate, the rate applied to trusts and the top personal income tax 
                                                 
11 On the MITTS model, see Creedy, J., Duncan, A.S., Scutella, R. and Harris,M. (2002) 
Microsimulation Modelling of Taxation and The Labour Market: The Melbourne Institute Tax and 
Transfer Simulator. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
12 See Creedy, J. and Hérault, N. (2009) Optimal Income Tax Reforms: A Microsimulation Analysis. 
University of Melbourne Department of Economics Working Paper. rate. It sometimes appears that the Report treats alignment as a basic principle, while 
recognising that it would involve a loss of degrees of freedom in policy choices. Yet 
again it is more appropriate to consider it as a rule of thumb rather than a principle. 
Starting from some specified objectives, and given other features (such as regulations 
regarding allowances and deductions, the costs of income shifting and the precise 
extent of behavioural responses to tax changes), it would be extremely difficult (as 
mentioned above) to produce an optimal structure: there is little reason a priori to 
expect identical rates to emerge from such a problem. And of course the relevant rates 
on trusts and corporations are proportional, while the average personal income tax 
rate is below the top marginal rate. However, there can be little doubt, as the Report 
argues, that the rates have now become seriously out of line and some movement 
towards alignment, if not necessarily to equality, is a high priority.  
3  Precision Regarding Concepts 
This section examines some concepts which are fundamental in tax analyses 
but which might perhaps have been more clearly discussed in the TWG Report. 
Subsection 3.1 argues that further precision is needed when discussing the concept of 
tax progressivity. The treatment of elasticities and their role in tax evaluations is 
examined in subsection 3.2. 
3.1  Tax Progressivity 
Perhaps surprisingly, one major concept is not defined by the TWG, leading to 
some potential misunderstanding. A tax structure is progressive if, over the relevant 
income range (where income is the tax base), the average tax rate (tax divided by 
income) increases with income. However, progressivity does not require ‘marginal rate progression’, which refers to an increasing marginal tax rate as income increases. 
Indeed, a considerable degree of progressivity can be achieved with a proportional 
tax, combined with a basic income (that is, a fixed and unconditional transfer 
payment).  
This is relevant when considering a change in the tax mix – a shift from 
personal income taxes towards indirect taxation in the form of the GST. This can of 
course be achieved in a variety of ways, including reductions in all marginal income 
tax rates, or as part of a rate-flattening exercise with reduction in the top personal rate 
of taxation. A revenue-neutral tax shift must, as suggested earlier, involve losers as 
well as winners. However, the approach adopted clearly depends on the value 
judgements regarding income distribution. Where concern is largely with low-income 
groups, a cut in higher income tax rates can be combined with an increase in the GST 
rate, along with a suitable adjustment to benefit levels to maintain their real values. 
After all, this was done when GST was first introduced. With reference to the GST, it 
is worth stressing yet again (as mentioned by the Report) that a uniform tax on all 
goods and services is not regressive at all – the appropriate tax base is total 
expenditure, not income.
13 In New Zealand, the combination of several excise taxes 
with GST produces a very slightly regressive indirect tax structure.
14  
                                                 
13 In the same way, any uniform increase in all prices – for example brought about by inflation – would 
not be considered as regressive.  
14 On indirect taxes in New Zealand, see Creedy, J. and Sleeman, C. (2006) The Distributional Effects 
of Indirect Taxes: Models and Applications from New Zealand. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. The Report 
(p. 47) shows that GST as a proportion of total expenditure is similar across income decile groups.  3.2  Taxes and Elasticities 
The TWG Report suggests that, ‘taxing those bases that are least likely to be 
subject to significant behavioural change … (inelastic bases) is also a sound principle 
to adopt when … broadening the tax base’ (p. 10). This is of course an allusion to the 
efficiency effects of taxes, concerning the distorting effect of non-uniform taxes on 
behaviour. Reference is made to an analytical result obtained early in the last century; 
this suggests that if the aim is to minimise a measure of the excess burden arising 
from taxation (the difference between the total welfare loss and the tax raised), the 
appropriate tax structure turns out to be one that reduces the consumption of all goods 
by the same proportion. Hence, it implies the need for a higher tax on inelastic goods. 
However, this result is severely limited because it refers to a single-person economy, 
and thus excludes any equity concerns. Furthermore the measure of welfare loss 
considered was that of ‘consumer’s surplus’, defined for a single commodity as the 
difference between the maximum amount the consumer would be prepared to pay for 
a number of units and the amount actually paid (in view of the fact that each unit is 
sold at a fixed price).  
Importantly, the most widely accepted modern measures of the efficiency 
effects (excess burdens) arising from taxation are based on ‘compensating variations’ 
and ‘equivalent variations’. These measures depend not on market price or income 
elasticities, but on ‘compensated’ elasticities, where the ‘income effects’ of the price 
changes are excluded.
15 This is not merely a pedantic point about definitions. In 
                                                 
15 For an introduction to these concepts, see Creedy, J. (2004) The excess burden of taxation. 
Australian Economic Review, 37, pp. 454-464. examining excess burdens per dollar of revenue paid by individuals in Australia using 
the microsimulation model, MITTS, many cases were found where the marginal 
welfare costs are very high, even for those whose labour supply was found to change 
very little.
16  
Here is perhaps the appropriate point to consider how the TWG’s discussion 
of a Land Tax fits in with their list of tax principles. It is not in fact motivated by the 
use of a comprehensive income measure of ability to pay. Indeed, the comprehensive 
income concept gives no support to any kind of wealth (or net worth) tax – only tax 
on the income arising from assets (both human and non-human capital). The proposal 
for a Land Tax therefore relies exclusively on the desire to find an additional tax base, 
using the criterion relating to the elasticity (that is, concerned only with a definition of 
efficiency). An argument is that, given the fixed total stock of land in a country, a 
land tax does not have efficiency problems (whereas, for example, a poll tax – a tax 
on each person resident in a country - can induce migration).  However, individuals 
can change their wealth portfolios by buying and selling land. Furthermore, transition, 
tax shifting and equity effects are clearly important considerations which the Report 
recognises need further analysis. 
                                                 
16 See Creedy, J., Hérault, N. and Kalb, K. (2009) Measuring Welfare Changes in Behavioural 
Microsimulation Modelling: Accounting for the Random Utility Component. University of Melbourne 
Department of Economics Working Paper. 4  Some Next Steps 
The TWG Report recognises that further analyses need to be carried out. 
Given the remarkable short time scale within which the Report was produced, and the 
low level of resources made available to the TWG, this is of course inevitable. One 
area mentioned concerns the benefit, or income transfer, system and its integration 
with the personal income tax structure. In particular, Working for Families (WfF) has 
introduced substantial marginal tax rates applying to middle income groups, and high 
levels of government expenditure. It also appears that there are unintended 
consequences whereby a substantial number of individuals who are not in the ‘target 
group’ considered by the designers of the system are in receipt of WfF transfers. The 
TWG was unable to consider this issue, and it is suggested here that a comprehensive 
review of WfF needs to be given very high priority. 
Additional areas where further work is needed, not mentioned explicitly by the 
Report but undoubtedly supported by it, include behavioural responses. Despite the 
potential importance of foreign direct investment, and profit-shifting by corporations 
(both real and that achieved by the exploitation of transfer pricing), very little solid 
empirical evidence is available regarding companies operating (or previously 
operating) in NZ. Similarly, there no longer exists a behavioural model in NZ that is 
capable of producing estimates of labour supply responses to tax changes and their 
associated efficiency (welfare) costs.
17 
                                                 
17 For a description of the only large scale New Zealand microsimulation model, and examples of 
policy simulations, see chapter 12 of Buddelmeyer, H., Creedy, J. and Kalb, G. (2008) Tax Policy 
Design and Behavioural Microsimulation Modelling (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). One suggestion made several times in the Report is that there should be some 
kind of review body, or organisation, charged with, and sufficiently equipped to carry 
out, the task of conducting regular independent evaluations of the tax structure in NZ. 
This, it seems, is not intended to propose yet another quasi non-governmental 
organisation (QUANGO), but presumably the TWG has in mind something like the 
valuable role played (among other things) by the Institute for Fiscal Studies in 
London. The aim is to inform public ‘rational debate’, by investigating the detailed 
implications of tax policy changes. It is suggested in the Report that this could impose 
some constraints on politicians, with a propensity to tinker with a tax structure in 
ways that have insufficient regard for the integrity of the complete system. It could 
also help to make the system less vulnerable to the inevitable special pleading by 
interest groups. The question of the funding and location of such a body was not 
discussed in the Report. 
5  Conclusions 
In any discussion of taxation, it is important to recognise the inevitability of 
disagreement and a lack of consensus.
18 There are simply too many value judgements 
involved and too many areas where only informed guesses must be made in the 
absence of direct information. It is certainly no weakness of the TWG Report that it 
does not report unanimous support for various policy reform proposals. However, the 
TWG members clearly managed to agree on a broad framework for discussing 
                                                 
18 For further elaboration of the reasons for this comment, see Creedy, J. (2010) Tax and transfer 
tensions: designing direct tax structures. Australian Economic Review (forthcoming). reforms, and the need for some action. A Report which simply set out a dogmatic 
agenda for reform, using the kind of rhetoric that is familiar from the commentaries of 
special-interest groups, would have little value and would be read only by like-
minded people.  
The influence of the TWG on the tax debate, indeed in making taxation itself 
more prominent in public debate, is clear from even the most casual examination of 
the media in New Zealand. The suggestion that there are substantial revenue risks and 
that the distorting effects of some forms of taxation have growth effects as well as the 
less visible – but nonetheless substantial – excess burdens, has clearly influenced the 
government in its thinking about tax structure changes. 
As mentioned earlier, the strength of the report is its attempt to contribute to 
rational policy debate by rehearsing the various arguments in a clear and dispassionate 
manner, so that those on different sides of the debate can come to understand just why 
they differ. That a disparate group of individuals from a range of backgrounds have 
established some common ground in a way of thinking about taxes is itself sufficient 
cause for praise. The Report can be read with interest and profit by all those interested 
in tax policy. 